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core/server/handlers/auth.go
2026-03-07 11:27:24 +00:00

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package handlers
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"log"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
"git.gobha.me/xcaliber/chat-switchboard/auth"
"git.gobha.me/xcaliber/chat-switchboard/config"
"git.gobha.me/xcaliber/chat-switchboard/crypto"
"git.gobha.me/xcaliber/chat-switchboard/database"
"git.gobha.me/xcaliber/chat-switchboard/models"
"git.gobha.me/xcaliber/chat-switchboard/store"
)
// Claims represents the JWT payload.
//
// bcryptCost is shared across auth.go, settings.go, admin.go
const bcryptCost = 12
type Claims struct {
UserID string `json:"user_id"`
Email string `json:"email"`
Role string `json:"role"`
jwt.RegisteredClaims
}
type AuthHandler struct {
cfg *config.Config
stores store.Stores
uekCache *crypto.UEKCache
provider auth.Provider
}
func NewAuthHandler(cfg *config.Config, s store.Stores, uekCache *crypto.UEKCache, provider auth.Provider) *AuthHandler {
return &AuthHandler{cfg: cfg, stores: s, uekCache: uekCache, provider: provider}
}
func (h *AuthHandler) Register(c *gin.Context) {
if !h.provider.SupportsRegistration() {
c.JSON(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, gin.H{"error": "registration not supported for this auth mode"})
return
}
result, err := h.provider.Register(c, h.stores)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(auth.ErrorToHTTPStatus(err), gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
if result.VaultHint != "" {
if err := h.initVault(c.Request.Context(), result.User.ID, result.VaultHint); err != nil {
log.Printf("⚠ Failed to init vault for user %s: %v", result.User.ID, err)
}
}
if !result.User.IsActive {
c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, gin.H{
"message": "Account created but requires admin approval",
"user_id": result.User.ID,
})
return
}
tokens, err := h.generateTokens(result.User)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "failed to generate tokens"})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusCreated, tokens)
}
func (h *AuthHandler) Login(c *gin.Context) {
result, err := h.provider.Authenticate(c, h.stores)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(auth.ErrorToHTTPStatus(err), gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
if result.VaultHint != "" {
h.unlockVault(c.Request.Context(), result.User, result.VaultHint)
}
h.stores.Users.UpdateLastLogin(c.Request.Context(), result.User.ID)
tokens, err := h.generateTokens(result.User)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "failed to generate tokens"})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, tokens)
}
func (h *AuthHandler) Refresh(c *gin.Context) {
var req struct {
RefreshToken string `json:"refresh_token" binding:"required"`
}
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": err.Error()})
return
}
tokenHash := hashToken(req.RefreshToken)
userID, err := h.stores.Users.GetRefreshToken(c.Request.Context(), tokenHash)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "invalid refresh token"})
return
}
// Revoke the used token (rotate)
h.stores.Users.RevokeRefreshToken(c.Request.Context(), tokenHash)
user, err := h.stores.Users.GetByID(c.Request.Context(), userID)
if err != nil || !user.IsActive {
c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "user not found or inactive"})
return
}
tokens, err := h.generateTokens(user)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "failed to generate tokens"})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, tokens)
}
func (h *AuthHandler) Logout(c *gin.Context) {
var req struct {
RefreshToken string `json:"refresh_token"`
}
c.ShouldBindJSON(&req)
if req.RefreshToken != "" {
tokenHash := hashToken(req.RefreshToken)
h.stores.Users.RevokeRefreshToken(c.Request.Context(), tokenHash)
}
// Evict UEK from session cache
if userID, exists := c.Get("user_id"); exists {
h.uekCache.Evict(userID.(string))
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"message": "logged out"})
}
func (h *AuthHandler) generateTokens(user *models.User) (gin.H, error) {
// Access token (15 min)
accessClaims := Claims{
UserID: user.ID,
Email: user.Email,
Role: user.Role,
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(15 * time.Minute)),
IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
ID: uuid.New().String(),
},
}
accessToken := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, accessClaims)
accessString, err := accessToken.SignedString([]byte(h.cfg.JWTSecret))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Refresh token (7 days)
refreshRaw := uuid.New().String()
refreshHash := hashToken(refreshRaw)
expiresAt := time.Now().Add(7 * 24 * time.Hour)
if err := h.stores.Users.CreateRefreshToken(context.Background(), user.ID, refreshHash, expiresAt); err != nil {
log.Printf("warn: failed to store refresh token: %v", err)
}
return gin.H{
"access_token": accessString,
"refresh_token": refreshRaw,
"token_type": "Bearer",
"expires_in": 900,
"user": gin.H{
"id": user.ID,
"username": user.Username,
"email": user.Email,
"display_name": user.DisplayName,
"role": user.Role,
"handle": user.Handle,
"auth_source": user.AuthSource,
},
}, nil
}
func hashToken(token string) string {
h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
return hex.EncodeToString(h[:])
}
// ── Vault Lifecycle ─────────────────────────
// DestroyVaultDB nullifies a user's vault columns and deletes personal
// provider configs. This is the shared DB-level operation used by:
// - unlockVault (stale seal recovery)
// - BootstrapAdmin / SeedUsers (password rotation at startup)
// - AdminHandler.destroyVault (admin-initiated reset)
//
// Does NOT evict from UEK cache or write audit logs — callers handle that.
func DestroyVaultDB(ctx context.Context, userID string) (providersDeleted int64) {
_, err := database.DB.ExecContext(ctx, database.Q(`
UPDATE users
SET encrypted_uek = NULL, uek_salt = NULL, uek_nonce = NULL, vault_set = false
WHERE id = $1
`), userID)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("⚠ DestroyVaultDB: failed to clear vault columns for user %s: %v", userID, err)
}
result, err := database.DB.ExecContext(ctx, database.Q(`
DELETE FROM provider_configs WHERE scope = 'personal' AND owner_id = $1
`), userID)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("⚠ DestroyVaultDB: failed to delete personal providers for user %s: %v", userID, err)
return 0
}
rows, _ := result.RowsAffected()
return rows
}
// ProbeAndRepairVault checks whether a user's vault can be unlocked with
// the given password. If the vault doesn't exist (vault_set=false), this is
// a no-op. If the vault exists but the seal is stale (encrypted_uek was
// wrapped with a different password), the vault and personal providers are
// destroyed so initVault fires cleanly on next login.
//
// Used by BootstrapAdmin and SeedUsers where the password is known at
// startup but the UEK cache is not available.
func ProbeAndRepairVault(ctx context.Context, userID, password string) {
var vaultSet bool
var encryptedUEK, salt, nonce []byte
err := database.DB.QueryRowContext(ctx, database.Q(`
SELECT vault_set, encrypted_uek, uek_salt, uek_nonce
FROM users WHERE id = $1
`), userID).Scan(&vaultSet, &encryptedUEK, &salt, &nonce)
if err != nil || !vaultSet {
return // no vault to probe
}
pdk := crypto.DeriveKeyFromPassword(password, salt)
if _, err := crypto.UnwrapUEK(encryptedUEK, nonce, pdk); err == nil {
return // vault seal matches current password — all good
}
// Stale seal: password has actually changed since the vault was sealed
deleted := DestroyVaultDB(ctx, userID)
if deleted > 0 {
log.Printf(" 🔐 Vault stale-seal repair for user %s: cleared %d personal provider(s)", userID, deleted)
} else {
log.Printf(" 🔐 Vault stale-seal repair for user %s: vault columns cleared", userID)
}
}
// initVault generates a UEK, wraps it with the user's password, and stores
// the encrypted UEK + salt + nonce on the user record. Called on registration
// and on first login for pre-migration users.
func (h *AuthHandler) initVault(ctx context.Context, userID, password string) error {
if h.uekCache == nil {
return nil // Vault not configured (e.g. tests)
}
uek, err := crypto.GenerateUEK()
if err != nil {
return err
}
salt, err := crypto.GenerateSalt()
if err != nil {
return err
}
pdk := crypto.DeriveKeyFromPassword(password, salt)
encryptedUEK, nonce, err := crypto.WrapUEK(uek, pdk)
if err != nil {
return err
}
_, err = database.DB.ExecContext(ctx, database.Q(`
UPDATE users
SET encrypted_uek = $1, uek_salt = $2, uek_nonce = $3, vault_set = true
WHERE id = $4
`), encryptedUEK, salt, nonce, userID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Cache the UEK for the session
h.uekCache.Store(userID, uek)
log.Printf(" 🔐 Vault initialized for user %s", userID)
return nil
}
// unlockVault unwraps the UEK on login and caches it. If the user doesn't
// have a vault yet (pre-migration account), initializes one.
func (h *AuthHandler) unlockVault(ctx context.Context, user *models.User, password string) {
if h.uekCache == nil {
return
}
var vaultSet bool
var encryptedUEK, salt, nonce []byte
err := database.DB.QueryRowContext(ctx, database.Q(`
SELECT vault_set, encrypted_uek, uek_salt, uek_nonce
FROM users WHERE id = $1
`), user.ID).Scan(&vaultSet, &encryptedUEK, &salt, &nonce)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("⚠ Vault query failed for user %s: %v", user.ID, err)
return
}
if !vaultSet {
// Pre-migration user: initialize vault on first login
if err := h.initVault(ctx, user.ID, password); err != nil {
log.Printf("⚠ Vault init on login failed for user %s: %v", user.ID, err)
}
return
}
// Derive PDK from password and unwrap UEK
pdk := crypto.DeriveKeyFromPassword(password, salt)
uek, err := crypto.UnwrapUEK(encryptedUEK, nonce, pdk)
if err != nil {
// Stale seal: encrypted_uek was wrapped with a different password
// (e.g. admin reset, BootstrapAdmin rotation, or pre-UEK migration).
// The old UEK is irrecoverable. Destroy the vault and re-initialize
// with the current password so the user isn't permanently locked out.
deleted := DestroyVaultDB(ctx, user.ID)
if deleted > 0 {
log.Printf("⚠ Vault stale-seal recovery for user %s: cleared %d personal provider(s)", user.ID, deleted)
} else {
log.Printf("⚠ Vault stale-seal recovery for user %s: no personal providers to clear", user.ID)
}
if err := h.initVault(ctx, user.ID, password); err != nil {
log.Printf("⚠ Vault re-init failed for user %s: %v", user.ID, err)
}
return
}
h.uekCache.Store(user.ID, uek)
}
// BootstrapAdmin creates/updates the admin user from env vars (K8s secret).
func BootstrapAdmin(cfg *config.Config, s store.Stores) {
if cfg.AdminUsername == "" || cfg.AdminPassword == "" {
return
}
ctx := context.Background()
hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(cfg.AdminPassword), bcryptCost)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("⚠ Failed to hash admin password: %v", err)
return
}
existing, _ := s.Users.GetByUsername(ctx, cfg.AdminUsername)
if existing != nil {
// Update password and ensure admin role
s.Users.Update(ctx, existing.ID, map[string]interface{}{
"password_hash": string(hash),
"role": models.UserRoleAdmin,
"is_active": true,
})
// If the actual password changed, the vault seal is stale. Probe it
// with the current password and destroy only if unwrap fails.
// Ensure handle exists (backfill for pre-v0.24.0 users)
if existing.Handle == "" {
handle := auth.UniqueHandle(ctx, s.Users, models.HandleFromName(cfg.AdminUsername))
s.Users.Update(ctx, existing.ID, map[string]interface{}{"handle": handle})
}
ProbeAndRepairVault(ctx, existing.ID, cfg.AdminPassword)
log.Printf(" ✅ Admin user '%s' updated", cfg.AdminUsername)
return
}
email := cfg.AdminEmail
if email == "" {
email = cfg.AdminUsername + "@switchboard.local"
}
handle := auth.UniqueHandle(ctx, s.Users, models.HandleFromName(cfg.AdminUsername))
user := &models.User{
Username: strings.ToLower(cfg.AdminUsername),
Email: strings.ToLower(email),
PasswordHash: string(hash),
Role: models.UserRoleAdmin,
IsActive: true,
AuthSource: "builtin",
Handle: handle,
}
if err := s.Users.Create(ctx, user); err != nil {
log.Printf("⚠ Failed to create admin user: %v", err)
return
}
log.Printf(" ✅ Admin user '%s' created", cfg.AdminUsername)
}
// SeedUsers creates or updates users from the SEED_USERS env var.
// Format: "user:pass:role,user2:pass2:role2" where role is "admin" or "user".
// Upsert: existing users get their password and role refreshed on every restart.
// Gated to non-production environments.
func SeedUsers(cfg *config.Config, s store.Stores) {
if cfg.SeedUsers == "" {
log.Printf(" SEED_USERS not set, skipping")
return
}
if cfg.Environment == "production" {
log.Printf("⚠ SEED_USERS ignored in production environment")
return
}
ctx := context.Background()
entries := strings.Split(cfg.SeedUsers, ",")
log.Printf(" 🌱 SEED_USERS: %d entries to process", len(entries))
for _, entry := range entries {
entry = strings.TrimSpace(entry)
if entry == "" {
continue
}
parts := strings.SplitN(entry, ":", 3)
if len(parts) < 2 {
log.Printf("⚠ Seed user skipped (bad format, want user:pass[:role]): %q", entry)
continue
}
username := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(parts[0]))
password := strings.TrimSpace(parts[1])
role := models.UserRoleUser
if len(parts) >= 3 && strings.TrimSpace(parts[2]) == "admin" {
role = models.UserRoleAdmin
}
if username == "" || password == "" {
log.Printf("⚠ Seed user skipped (empty username or password)")
continue
}
hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(password), bcryptCost)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("⚠ Seed user '%s' skipped (hash error): %v", username, err)
continue
}
// Upsert: update password+role if user exists, create if not
existing, _ := s.Users.GetByUsername(ctx, username)
if existing != nil {
s.Users.Update(ctx, existing.ID, map[string]interface{}{
"password_hash": string(hash),
"role": role,
"is_active": true,
})
// Probe vault with current password — only destroys if seal is stale
if existing.Handle == "" {
handle := auth.UniqueHandle(ctx, s.Users, models.HandleFromName(username))
s.Users.Update(ctx, existing.ID, map[string]interface{}{"handle": handle})
}
ProbeAndRepairVault(ctx, existing.ID, password)
log.Printf(" 🌱 Seed user '%s' updated (role=%s)", username, role)
continue
}
handle := auth.UniqueHandle(ctx, s.Users, models.HandleFromName(username))
user := &models.User{
Username: username,
Email: username + "@switchboard.local",
PasswordHash: string(hash),
Role: role,
IsActive: true,
AuthSource: "builtin",
Handle: handle,
}
if err := s.Users.Create(ctx, user); err != nil {
log.Printf("⚠ Seed user '%s' failed: %v", username, err)
continue
}
log.Printf(" 🌱 Seed user '%s' created (role=%s, active=true)", username, role)
}
}
// IsRegistrationEnabled checks the platform policy.
func IsRegistrationEnabled(s store.Stores) bool {
val, _ := s.Policies.GetBool(context.Background(), "allow_registration")
return val
}