Fix session cookie max-age bug; add UI hardening roadmap

Cookie max-age was 900s (15 min, matching access token) but refresh
token lives 7 days — users got bounced to login after 15 min idle
because the Go SSR middleware rejected the expired cookie before JS
could refresh. Now cookie max-age = 604800s (7 days) on both the
client (auth.js) and server (auth.go OIDC callback).

Go page-auth middleware accepts expired-but-signed JWTs via new
parseJWTIgnoringExpiry() so the page shell renders and the Preact SDK
can refresh client-side. API middleware still validates expiry strictly.
6 new middleware tests cover strict/lenient/tampered/garbage cases.

VERSION bumped to 0.6.8 (rebrand was already shipped but file missed).
ROADMAP-UI.md added with 7 milestones (v0.6.9–v0.6.15).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

server/middleware/auth.go

@@ -142,9 +142,30 @@ func parseAndValidateJWT(tokenString string, jwtSecret string) (*Claims, bool) {
 	return claims, true
 }
 
+// parseJWTIgnoringExpiry parses a JWT and validates the signature but
+// tolerates an expired token. Used by page-auth middleware so the Go
+// template can render the page shell even when the access token has
+// lapsed — the Preact SDK will refresh the token client-side.
+// Returns (claims, signatureValid). A tampered or unsigned token
+// returns (nil, false).
+func parseJWTIgnoringExpiry(tokenString string, jwtSecret string) (*Claims, bool) {
+	claims := &Claims{}
+	_, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(tokenString, claims, func(t *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
+		if _, ok := t.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodHMAC); !ok {
+			return nil, jwt.ErrSignatureInvalid
+		}
+		return []byte(jwtSecret), nil
+	}, jwt.WithoutClaimsValidation())
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+	return claims, true
+}
+
 // UserIDFromCookie extracts the user ID from the arm_token cookie without
 // requiring authentication. Returns "" if no valid token is found.
-// Used by unauthenticated routes that want optional user context.
+// Tolerates expired tokens (signature must be valid) so that user preferences
+// still apply even when the access token has lapsed.
 func UserIDFromCookie(c *gin.Context, jwtSecret string) string {
 	cookie, err := c.Cookie("arm_token")
 	if err != nil || cookie == "" {
@@ -152,7 +173,11 @@ func UserIDFromCookie(c *gin.Context, jwtSecret string) string {
 	}
 	claims, ok := parseAndValidateJWT(cookie, jwtSecret)
 	if !ok {
-		return ""
+		// Accept expired-but-signed token for optional user context
+		claims, ok = parseJWTIgnoringExpiry(cookie, jwtSecret)
+		if !ok {
+			return ""
+		}
 	}
 	return claims.UserID
 }

server/middleware/auth_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+package middleware
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
+)
+
+const testSecret = "test-jwt-secret-key"
+
+func makeToken(t *testing.T, userID, email string, expiresAt time.Time) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	claims := Claims{
+		UserID: userID,
+		Email:  email,
+		RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
+			ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(expiresAt),
+			IssuedAt:  jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour)),
+			ID:        "test-jti",
+		},
+	}
+	token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)
+	s, err := token.SignedString([]byte(testSecret))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return s
+}
+
+func TestParseAndValidateJWT_Valid(t *testing.T) {
+	tok := makeToken(t, "u1", "a@b.com", time.Now().Add(15*time.Minute))
+	claims, ok := parseAndValidateJWT(tok, testSecret)
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("expected valid token to parse")
+	}
+	if claims.UserID != "u1" {
+		t.Errorf("UserID = %q, want u1", claims.UserID)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParseAndValidateJWT_Expired(t *testing.T) {
+	tok := makeToken(t, "u1", "a@b.com", time.Now().Add(-5*time.Minute))
+	_, ok := parseAndValidateJWT(tok, testSecret)
+	if ok {
+		t.Fatal("expected expired token to be rejected by strict parser")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParseAndValidateJWT_WrongSecret(t *testing.T) {
+	tok := makeToken(t, "u1", "a@b.com", time.Now().Add(15*time.Minute))
+	_, ok := parseAndValidateJWT(tok, "wrong-secret")
+	if ok {
+		t.Fatal("expected wrong-secret token to be rejected")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParseJWTIgnoringExpiry_Expired(t *testing.T) {
+	tok := makeToken(t, "u1", "a@b.com", time.Now().Add(-5*time.Minute))
+	claims, ok := parseJWTIgnoringExpiry(tok, testSecret)
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("expected expired token to be accepted by lenient parser")
+	}
+	if claims.UserID != "u1" {
+		t.Errorf("UserID = %q, want u1", claims.UserID)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParseJWTIgnoringExpiry_WrongSecret(t *testing.T) {
+	tok := makeToken(t, "u1", "a@b.com", time.Now().Add(-5*time.Minute))
+	_, ok := parseJWTIgnoringExpiry(tok, "wrong-secret")
+	if ok {
+		t.Fatal("expected tampered token to be rejected even with lenient parser")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParseJWTIgnoringExpiry_GarbageToken(t *testing.T) {
+	_, ok := parseJWTIgnoringExpiry("not.a.jwt", testSecret)
+	if ok {
+		t.Fatal("expected garbage token to be rejected")
+	}
+}

server/middleware/page_auth.go

@@ -50,10 +50,17 @@ func AuthOrRedirect(cfg *config.Config, users store.UserStore, cache *UserStatus
 			return
 		}
 
+		// Try strict validation first (token not expired).
 		claims, ok := parseAndValidateJWT(tokenString, cfg.JWTSecret)
 		if !ok {
-			redirectToLogin(c, loginPath)
-			return
+			// Fallback: accept an expired-but-signed token so the page
+			// shell can render and the Preact SDK can refresh client-side.
+			// A tampered/unsigned token still gets rejected.
+			claims, ok = parseJWTIgnoringExpiry(tokenString, cfg.JWTSecret)
+			if !ok {
+				redirectToLogin(c, loginPath)
+				return
+			}
 		}
 
 		if claims.UserID == "" {